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Abstract
We examine the e¤ects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies.
We do this by extending existing models of asymmetric duopoly and symmetric oligopoly
where consumer expectations about market shares are passive. We rst calibrate product
di¤erentiation parameters using detailed data from the Spanish market from 2010. Next,
we predict equilibrium outcomes and welfare e¤ects under alternative scenarios of future
termination rates. Lowering termination rates typically lowers prots of all networks and
improves consumer and total surplus.
JEL: D43, K23, L51, L96
Keywords: Mobile Termination Rates, Network E¤ects, Simulations, Telecommunica-
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1 Introduction
An important technological aspect of mobile telecommunications is that subscribers of di¤er-
ent network operators can call each other, which means that di¤erent networks are compati-
ble. The possibility (and even obligation) to interconnect networks has been key to promote
entry and competition. Since most people will only subscribe to one of the networks, each
network holds a monopoly position over the so called market for termination of calls directed
to its subscribers.
Regulators around the world, and especially in the European Union, have been and still
are concerned about too high mobile termination rates (MTR) and intervene in the markets
of termination. The reason is that high termination rates are thought to lead to ine¢ ciently
high retail prices. At present, the European Commission recommends national regulatory
authorities (NRAs) to push termination rates further down to the cost of terminating a call
by the end of 2012 (EC 2009). Network operators, on the other hand, have been and keep
opposing cuts in termination rates. They often argue that lowering MTRs will lead to the
reduction of handset subsidies and that in the end, consumers are hurt by this. This is
sometimes referred to as a waterbed e¤ect. Although the existence of a waterbed e¤ect is
usually acknowledged by regulators, the strength of this e¤ect is heavily disputed.
The burden of MTR regulation is quite high and time consuming. Each NRA needs
to start a round of public consultations with stakeholders every time it wants to propose
a reduction in MTR. This involves several rounds of discussions and debates, backed up
by consultants and studies. One may ask oneself whether all this e¤ort is worth spending.
Namely, the mainstream theoretical models (La¤ont, Rey and Tirole [1998b], and Gans and
King [2001]) predict that lowering MTR towards cost indeed improves total welfare but
does so by increasing industry prot at the expense of consumer surplus. This is somewhat
puzzling given the opposition by the industry and the intentions of NRAs (who are supposed
to protect consumers) to reduce MTRs. Hurkens and López (2010) recently established a
new theoretical result, that in fact predicts the opposite: consumers benet and industry
loses from reductions in MTR. This new theory emphasizes the role of network externalities,
and in particular, the role of consumer expectations. The puzzle is resolved when consumers
expectations are assumed passive but required to be fullled in equilibrium (as dened by
Katz and Shapiro [1985]), instead of being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices,
as assumed in earlier works. It is worth mentioning that a few recent papers also attempt to
reconcile the mentioned puzzle (Armstrong and Wright [2009], Hoernig, Inderst and Valletti
[2009], and Jullien Rey and Sand-Zantman [2010])1.
1These three papers have in common that they introduce additional realistic features of the telecommuni-
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In this article we intend to quantify the consumer gains and industry losses of MTR
regulation by calibrating our new model. In order to do so we dispose of a rich data set
of the Spanish market, made publicly available by CMT, the Spanish NRA. This data set
contains not only data about number of subscribers, minutes of tra¢ c, and revenues, but also
distinguishes between pre-pay and post-pay clients, and on-net and o¤-net tra¢ c. Moreover,
it contains data about revenues obtained from termination and those obtained from xed
monthly subscription fees. This is important since theoretical predictions depend crucially on
the type of competition (linear or non-linear tari¤s) and on whether termination-based price
discrimination is allowed for or not. The data reveal that only post-pay clients pay monthly
xed fees and that there exist (on average) signicant on-net/o¤-net price di¤erentials. Since
post-pay clients make much more calls and generate much more revenues than pre-pay clients,
we focus in this article on this segment of the market. Moreover, we will allow rms to charge
di¤erent prices for on- and o¤-net calls.
Before we can start with the calibration it is necessary to extend our theoretical model
in order to allow for (i) more than two rms, (ii) asymmetries (in market shares and in
termination rates), and (iii) call externality. In fact, our theoretical model has been extended
and shown to be robust to all three extensions in isolation. However, in order to calibrate the
Spanish market we need to extend our model in all three directions simultaneously. Since
it is very hard to obtain analytical results for this triple extension, we resort to numerical
methods. The rst two are necessary since in Spain there are four major rms with very
asymmetric market shares. Moreover, not all networks have been subject to the same MTR.
We believe the extension to call externalities to be important as it has been argued (e.g.
Harbord and Pagnozzi [2010], Harbord and Hoernig [2010]) that if the call externality is
very strong, so that people enjoy receiving calls as much as placing calls (or even more,
since receiving calls is usually free of charge in Europe) reducing MTRs may be benecial
both to rms and to consumers, despite the reduction in handset subsidies, simply because
consumers will receive much more calls when MTRs and, as a consequence, retail prices are
reduced.
Our simulation results show that lowering termination rates toward cost is always good for
consumer surplus and total welfare but hurts all rms. While the increase in total welfare
is mild (0:5   1% per quarter), total prot is seriously a¤ected (from  5:4% to  23%);
the improve on consumer surplus is moderate (1:6%   5:4%). These gures are, however,
cation industry into the La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) framework and then show that for some parameter
range joint prots are maximized at termination charges above cost. Moreover, these papers conclude that
the need to regulate termination charges is reduced since the socially optimal termination charge would also
be above cost. In contrast, Hurkens and López (2010) nd that total welfare is maximized with termination
charges at or below cost.
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higher for larger values of the call externality parameter. We also obtain that the two larger
operators increase their market share as we reduce the level of MTRs. The bill and keep
regime yields the better outcome in terms of total welfare.
Our simulations conrm that there exists a partial waterbed e¤ect on the xed component
of the three-part tari¤. While the xed fee decreases as the termination charge increases,
rms keep part of termination rents instead of passing them on to their customers; this
explains why prot is decreasing in termination charge. As it is shown in Hurkens and
López (2010), the partial waterbed e¤ect result is due to the assumption of passive consumer
expectations. Nonetheless, we also observe in our asymmetric oligopoly model that lowering
MTR does not always lead to increases in the xed fee. This is the case for the largest
rm, which may reduce its xed fee for a strong call externality. On the other hand, above
cost termination charges may induce the smallest operator to o¤er negative xed fees (i.e.,
subsidies); still it makes positive prot because of termination revenues. Finally, we explore
the impact of asymmetric termination rates on competition and welfare. We rst consider
asymmetric access price regulation of the form that the smallest rm (i.e. Yoigo) is allowed
to charge an access markup, whereas the rest of rms are subject to cost-based regulation.
The result is that Yoigo gains and other rms loose. Although granting an access markup
to the smallest operator slightly raises consumer surplus, it does reduce total welfare. This
result is analogous to that of Peitz (2005) for two rms and no call externality. Finally, when
also Orange (which is the third operator in the market) is granted an access markup, both
Yoigo and Orange benet. In addition, Orange increases its market share at the expense of
the two larger operators (i.e. Movistar and Vodafone).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces the model. Section III calibrates
the model with Spanish market data reported by CMT. Section IV reports our simulation
results and Section V concludes. All gures are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Model
To estimate the impact on total welfare, consumer surplus and producer surplus of regulation
in the Spanish market we need to consider a model of competition between multiple networks
with asymmetric market shares. In addition, the model must allow for price discrimination
between on-net and o¤-net calls and consider call externalities.
As commented above, in Hurkens and López (2010) we analyzed competition between
(i) an arbitrary number of networks, (ii) asymmetries, and (iii) call externality. However,
we examined each case in isolation. For our purposes we need to extend our theoretical
model in all three directions simultaneously. The general model will be constructed as
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follows: (i) to consider an arbitrary number of networks and imperfect competition we will
use the Logit model, (ii) to introduce asymmetries in market shares we will allow for a brand
loyalty parameter (as in Carter and Wright [1999, 2003]), (iii) nally, we will introduce call
externality by assuming that receivers obtain utility from receiving a call, as in Jeon et al.
(2004), Berger (2004, 2005), and López (2011).
We will relax the assumption of rationally responsive expectations and replace it by one
of fullled equilibrium expectations (as in Hurkens and López [2010]): First consumers form
expectations about network sizes, then rms set prices, and nally consumers make optimal
subscription or purchasing decisions, given the expectations and the prices.2 In equilibrium,
realized and expected network sizes coincide. We know that under rationally responsive
expectations, while reducing mobile termination rates to cost raises total surplus, it may
decrease consumer surplus. In particular, consumer surplus increases when termination
rates are lowered only if the call externality is very strong. However, under (passive) self-
fullling expectations, decreasing termination rates raises consumer surplus even if the call
externality is low.
The model we consider is a generalization of the network competition model with (passive)
self-fullling expectations. We consider competition between n  2 full-coverage networks.
Each has the same cost structure. The marginal cost of a call equals c = cO + cT , where
cO and cT denote the costs borne by the originating and terminating network, respectively.
To terminate an o¤-net call, the originating network j 6= i must pay a non-negative access
charge ai to the terminating network i. The termination mark-up from terminating a call in
network i is equal to
mi  ai   cT .
Networks (i.e., rms) o¤er di¤erentiated but substitutable services. Firms compete for
a continuum of consumers of mass M . Each rm i (i = 1; :::; n) charges a xed fee Fi and
may discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls. Firm is marginal on-net price is written
pii and o¤-net price for a call from network i to network j is written pij. Consumers utility
from making calls of length q is given by a concave, increasing and bounded utility function
u(q), whereas consumers utility from receiving a call of that length is u(q). We assume that
u = u. Call demand q(p) is dened by u0(q(p)) = p. The indirect utility derived from
making calls at price p is v(p) = u(q(p))   pq(p). For given prices pii and pij, the prot
2Instead, under rationally responsive expectations the literature assumes that rst rms o¤er prices, then
consumers form expectations about network sizes and make optimal subscription decisions, given the prices
and their expectations. This means that for all prices (even for those out of the equilibrium) expectations
are required to be self-fullling.
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earned on the on-net calls is
R(pii) = (pii   c)q(pi),
whereas the prot earned on the o¤-net calls to network j is
R^j(pij) = (pij   c mj)q(pij).
In order to calibrate the model we shall assume that call demand is linear. Thus, R(p) has
a unique maximum at p = pM , is increasing when p < pM , and decreasing when p > pM ,
where pM denotes the monopoly price.
We make the standard assumption of a balanced calling pattern, which means that the
percentage of calls originating on a given network and completed on another given (including
the same) network is equal to the fraction of consumers subscribing to the terminating
network. Let i denote the market share of network i. The prot of network i is therefore
equal to:
i  iM

iR(pii) +
X
j 6=i
jR^j(pij) +
X
j 6=i
jmiq(pji) + Fi   f

. (1)
Market share. The n rms have complete coverage and compete for a continuum
of consumers of mass M . Market shares are derived using a Logit model. Given some
expectations i and prices, a customer subscribed to rm i obtains the following utility
wi = i + i[v(pii) + u(q(pii))] +
X
j 6=i
j [v(pij) + u(q(pji))]  Fi,
where i  0 is the brand loyalty parameter for network i.
We now add a random noise term and dene Ui = wi+"i, for i = 1:::n. The parameter
 > 0 reects the degree of product di¤erentiation in a Logit model. A high value of  implies
that most of the value is determined by a random draw so that competition between the rms
is rather weak. The noise terms "i are random variables of zero mean and unit variance,
identically and independently double exponentially distributed. They reect consumers
preference for one good over another. A consumer will subscribe to network i if and only if
Ui > Uj for j 6= i = 1:::n. The probability of subscribing to network i is denoted by i where
i =
exp[wi=]Pn
k=1 exp[wk=]
. (2)
Note that
@i
@Fi
=  i(1  i)

, (3)
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while for j 6= i
@j
@Fi
=
ij

. (4)
Consumer surplus. Consumer surplus in the Logit model has been derived by Small
and Rosen (1981) and for a mass M = 1 is given by (up to a constant)
CS =  ln
 
nX
k=1
exp[wk=]
!
. (5)
Timing. The terms of interconnection are regulated. Given access charges fa1; :::; ang
(or equivalently, given termination mark-ups fm1; :::;mng) the timing of the game is as
follows:
1. Consumers form expectations i about the number of subscribers of each network i
with i  0, and
P
i i = 1 (i.e. we assume full participation).
2. Firms take these expectations as given and choose simultaneously retail tari¤s Ti =
(Fi; fpijgnj=1).
3. Consumers make rational subscription and consumption decisions, given their expec-
tations and given the networkstari¤s.
Therefore, market share i is a function of prices and consumer expectations. Self-
fullling expectations imply that at equilibrium i = i.
Call prices. It is straightforward to show that the optimal on-net price equals
pii =
c
1 + 
. (6)
This price maximizes the total surplus from on-net calls. Note that this price is equal to
cost when there is no call externality (that is, when  = 0) but is strictly below cost when
call externalities exist. In this way the network perfectly internalizes the externality.
In order to obtain the formula for o¤-net prices, we need to resort to the usual perceived
marginal cost principle: a rm can o¤er its subscribers the same surplus more e¢ ciently by
setting pij closer to cost while adjusting the xed fee Fi accordingly. When there is no call
externality this yields pij = c+mj. However, when there exist call externalities one needs to
be careful in an oligopoly with at least three rms. For example, lowering pij will improve
the welfare of consumers on networks i and j, but not on other networks k. Raising Fi so
as to maintain the number of subscribers of network i constant is possible. However, the
relative market shares of networks j and k would change. In this example, j=k would
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increase. It would thus not be correct to assume that all market shares remain constant.
To circumvent this problem we will assume that each network i charges a uniform o¤-net
price p^i for calls to all networks j 6= i. In this case, a change in p^i a¤ects all subscribers
from networks j 6= i equally and thus keeps their relative market shares constant. Adjusting
Fi to keep i constant now implies that in fact all market shares are kept constant. It is
straightforward to show that the optimal o¤-net price equals
p^i =
P
j 6=i j(c+mj)
1  (1 + )i . (7)
Note that this o¤-net price increases in the call externality parameter. The higher the benet
of receiving calls, the higher will be the optimal o¤-net price in order to reduce the relative
attractiveness of rival networks.
Fixed fees. The xed fees are obtained by keeping call prices constant in the prot func-
tion and computing the rst-order conditions using equations (3) and (4). After substituting
the call prices found in equations (6) and (7) this yields
Fi = f +

1  i   2iR(pii) +
2i
1  i
X
j 6=i
jR^j(p^i) +
2i
1  i
X
j 6=i
jmiq(p^j). (8)
Equilibrium. The equilibrium prices are given in terms of market shares, which are en-
dogenous. In order to solve for the equilibrium market shares one needs to combine equations
(6), (7), (8) and (2). Analytically this is hard, if not impossible, to do but numerically there
is no problem, as long as one knows the termination charges, call demand, the strength of
the call externality and the cost, product di¤erentiation and brand loyalty parameters. We
will calibrate most of these parameters using publicly available data from CMT, the Spanish
national regulatory authority. We use data from the last quarter of 2010 reported in CMT
(2010).
3 Calibration of parameters
The Spanish market has four major networks, plus several small virtual network operators.
We restrict attention to the four major networks, Movistar, Vodafone, Orange and Yoigo.3
Since our model assumes rms compete in non-linear tari¤s, we use only the data pertaining
to post-pay customers. Table I reports the number of lines and relative market shares.
3The rest are MVNOs, which accounted for about 2.3% of post-pay mobile subscriptions in the last
quarter of 2010 (Table 67, CMT, 2010).
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Network Post-Pay Lines Market Share (%)
(1) Movistar 13723681 44.7
(2) Vodafone 9418402 31.7
(3) Orange 6454558 21.0
(4) Yoigo 1119354 3.6
Total 30715995 100.0
Table 1: Subscribers and Market shares in 2010Q4
The costs of origination and termination of a call is estimated at e0.0245/minute.4 We
have no evidence on the xed cost per subscriber. We assume f = 0. It does not inuence
directly the loss in industry prot or the gain in consumer surplus as a result of lowering
termination rates. However, it does indirectly inuence the results since we will calibrate
product di¤erentiation parameter  from the observed and predicted average xed fees.
However, our results appear to be very robust to changes in  so that we do not expect this
assumption to a¤ect the results signicantly.
We calibrate the call demand function by imposing linearity, assuming that price elasticity
equals  0:55 and by observing from the CMT data that average call price for post-pay clients
is equal to p = 0:108462 (found by dividing total revenue from call minutes by the number
of minutes).6 We nd q(p) = a  bp where
a = 654:9 and b = 2012:7.
Note that this call demand function should be interpreted as the total number of minutes
called by a single subscriber, assuming that each subscriber calls a mass 1 of other subscribers,
each with equal probability. Of course, in reality people make more calls of shorter duration,
but that does not inuence the analysis. Our approach in this respect follows closely de Bijl
and Peitz (2000, 2004).
We assume that in the last quarter of 2010 networks played the equilibrium, given the
existing termination rates. These termination rates were equal to e0:049505/minute for the
three largest rms and e0:067361/minute for the smallest operator Yoigo (CMT, 2009). Let
4This estimate is provided by the Spanish regulator (CMT, 2009) in the Resolution approving the es-
tablishment of a glide-path from October 2009 until April 2012. Also, the French regulator estimates that
the long-run incremental cost on mobile networks lies between 1 and 2 euro-cents (ARCEP, 2008). Harbord
and Hoernig (2010) assume a long-run marginal or incremental cost of originating and terminating calls on
mobile networks of 1ppm.
5Harbord and Hoernig (2010) argue that an elasticity of demand for mobile-originated calls of  0:5 is
consistent with the recent literature (Dewenter and Haucap [2008]), the UK Competition Commission (2003)
and Ofcom.
6See tables 48 and 56 in CMT (2010).
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us denote this combination of termination charges by a2010. This means that the observed
market shares for 2010Q4 are the equilibrium market shares. We can obtain the on-net and
o¤-net call prices (as a function of the unknown call externality parameter ). Similarly, we
can nd the equilibrium xed fees, which will depend on  and . In order to calibrate 
we use the observation from the data about average xed fees among post-pay subscribers.
This average xed fee in 2010Q4 was 11:61 euros (per quarter).7 We can calibrate  from
solving X
k
kFk = 11:64.
This yields  as a function of .8
Finally, substituting the calibrated  and using the prices obtained, the formulas for
market shares in the Logit model will yield us the brand loyalty parameters (all as functions
of ). To be precise, it will yield us the di¤erence in brand loyalty parameters 1   2,
2  3, and 3  4. Since only the di¤erences matter, we assume without loss of generality
that 4 = 0.
We could try to calibrate the call externality parameter  by observing that the di¤erence
between average o¤-net price and on-net price equals 0:0322.9 The theoretical di¤erence
between average o¤-net and on-net prices is increasing in . For  = 0 this di¤erence equals
approximately 0:026. This is obtained from the formulas for on- and o¤-net prices (6) and
(7) and from the observation that average o¤-net price equalsP
k k(1  k)q(p^k)p^kP
k k(1  k)q(p^k)
.
We can calibrate  by solving for the value that matches theoretical and observed di¤erence
between average o¤-net and on-net prices. This yields  = 0:0727. It suggests the call
externality is very mild. On the other hand, we know that in reality not all post-pay
contracts involve termination-based price discrimination. Some contracts will specify uniform
call prices. This obviously reduces the observed on-net/o¤-net price di¤erential. The true
call externality may thus be stronger than . Since we have no data on the proportion of
contracts with termination-based price discrimination, we are not able to get a more precise
calibration result. Still, if the call externality were very strong, rms would have incentives
to create a large di¤erence between prices for o¤-net and on-net calls and would not be very
tempted to o¤er contracts with uniform prices. One may expect that rms only o¤er uniform
calls prices if the gain from optimal termination-based price discrimination is small compared
7See Table 58 in CMT (2010).
8In our simulations  decreases with : from 10:27 for  = 0 to 6:67 for  = 0:8.
9This can be deduced from the numbers for on- and o¤-net calls in Tables 48 and 56 of CMT (2010).
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to the attractiveness of o¤ering a simple uniform tari¤s. This then would again suggest that
call externalities are not extremely strong. Also note that for  > 0:95 the largest rm
would, in theory, set the o¤-net price so high as to choke-o¤ o¤-net calls altogether.10 In
most of the simulation results we report we let  2 [0; 0:8] but values between 0:1 and 0:3
seem more plausible to us.
4 Simulation results
In this section, we rst explore the implications of various schemes for termination rates.
Secondly, we address the issue of asymmetric termination rates. We use the calibrated model
to simulate how prices, consumer surplus, prots and welfare change under di¤erent MTR
regimes. The rst regime we consider is the one that will be in place at 2012Q1 according
to the glide-path announced by CMT. These termination rates are
a2012 = (0:04; 0:04; 0:04; 0:049764):
That is, e0:04/minute for Movistar, Vodafone and Orange, and e0:049764/minute for Yoigo.
The next regime we simulate is where all termination rates are set equal to the cost of
termination, that is, ai = ac b  0:0245. Finally, we also consider the outcomes under a
hypothetical regime of bill and keep with ai = ab&k  0. The bill and keep regime is special
since below cost termination charges may lead some rms to set o¤-net price below on-net
price, especially when the call externality is relatively weak. We believe that such pricing
strategies are hard to implement. Therefore we impose that o¤-net prices cannot be below
on-net price. This implies that when rms would want to do this, they in fact must charge
a uniform price for on- and o¤-net calls. This price would be equal to perceived marginal
cost, so that rm i would then charge pii = p^i = ic+ (1  i)cO.
4.1 Alternative scenarios of future termination rates
We rst report simulation results for prices, market shares and individual prots. Then,
we discuss the implications of these results on total consumer surplus, total prot and total
welfare.
Prices. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the outcomes in xed fees and usage prices of various
interconnection arrangements (a2010; a2012; ac b; ab&k) for  2 [0; 0:8]. Not surprisingly, the
o¤-net price increases with the level of the access charge and . Earlier we noted that rms
10Because q(p) = 0 for p > 0:325.
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have incentives to raise o¤-net prices when the benet of receiving calls is higher because this
reduces the relative attractiveness of rival networks. However, Figure 1 shows that Yoigo has
little incentive to do this. The reason is that the amount of calls originated in that network
is small. Hence Yoigo harms the customers of rival networks very little when it increases the
o¤-net price.
Since o¤-net price is increasing in the access charge, for a su¢ ciently low access charge
it may happen that o¤-net price lies below on-net price. In particular, we observe that this
is the case when the bill and keep regime is adopted. Here there is a critical level of  below
which on-net price will be higher than o¤-net price, in which case we assume that rms
set a uniform price. In our simulations, we identify four clear regions: (1)  < 0:29, (2)
0:29   < 0:51, (3) 0:51   < 0:68, and (4)   0:68. As Figure 1 shows, under the bill
and keep regime, when  > 0:68 on-net price lies below o¤-net price for all rms. When
 < 0:68 Oranges o¤-net price is lower than its on-net price, thereby in this region Orange
sets the same price for on-net and o¤-net prices. Similarly, Vodafone and Movistar charge a
uniform price for  < 0:51 and  < 0:29, respectively.
Regarding the xed fees the following points should be noted. There exists a waterbed
e¤ect on the xed component of the three-part tari¤. This result is perfectly consistent with
what the theoretical result established in Hurkens and López (2010) led us to expect. The
number of o¤-net calls terminated on network i equals ni = i(1 i) which is increasing in
i when i < 1=2. Therefore, as the termination rate increases, the prot from terminating
calls increases and each rm will compete more ercely for market share. Yet, as will be
clear below, the waterbed e¤ect is not full. This means that rms keep part of termination
rents instead of passing them on to their customers, and thus their prot is lower when
the termination rate decreases. As it is shown in Hurkens and López (2010), the partial
waterbed e¤ect result is due to the assumption of passive consumer expectations. We say
that they are passive in the sense that they do not respond to out of equilibrium deviations
by rms. Under rationally responsive expectations, however, the waterbed e¤ect would be
higher than one hundred per cent. Consumers having rationally responsive expectations
means that any change of a price by one rm is assumed to lead to an instantaneous rational
change in expectations of all consumers, such that, given these changed expectations, optimal
subscription decisions will lead realized and expected network sizes to coincide. (For a
detailed discussion of consumer expectations and termination rates see Hurkens and López
[2010].) Remarkably, lowering MTR does not always lead to increases in the xed fee. As
Figure 2 illustrates, Movistars xed fee is lower with a2012 and ac b than with a2010 when
the call externality is strong (i.e. for  > 0:7). It is this last result which is not intuitively
immediate. A glance at equation (7) tells us that for large market share and strong call
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externality, o¤-net price is also high. Then, the amount of o¤-net calls originated on the
large network is low when  is high. Reducing the termination charge, brings down the
o¤-net price of the large network, which boosts the amount of o¤-net calls originated in that
network and thereby raises signicantly the relative attractiveness of rival networks (since
 is high). This leads the large network to reduce its xed fee so as to maintain its market
share.
Simulations show that Yoigos xed fee is negative with a2010 and a2012. The rest of rms
has a substantial advantage in demand because of incumbency. Therefore, Yoigo has to
compete more aggressively than its rivals to get some market share. As commented above,
the greater is the termination charge the more intense is competition. As Yoigo has to
undercut the price of its rivals so as to get some market share, high termination charges lead
Yoigo to o¤er subsidies. Still Yoigo makes positive prot because of termination revenues.
Market shares. Market shares are a¤ected by termination rates through their impact
on prices. Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ect of termination charges on market shares for di¤erent
values of . Let us rst turn our attention to the cases: a2010; a2012; and ac b. We observe
that the market share of the two largest operators (Movistar and Vodafone) is higher when
the access charge decreases. Conversely, the Oranges market share is lower with a2012
(respectively ac b) than with a2010 for  < 0:4 ( < 0:6). Similarly, the Yoigos market
share is increasing with the access charge, its market share is thus lower with a2012 and ac b
than with a2010. The appropriate conclusion seems to be that decreasing the access charge
favours (in terms of market shares) the larger operators. The reason is that reducing the
termination charge reduces the incentives for rms to compete for market share, this in turn
makes it easier for the two larger operators to increase their market share at the expense
of the smaller operators. Turning now to the bill and keep regime, it is interesting to note
that for moderate values of the call externality parameter, Movistar increases signicantly
its market share at the expense of rivalscustomer bases.
Prot. Firmsprot is typically increasing in the access charge. It has already been
noted that the waterbed e¤ect is not full. Therefore, as rms keep part of the termination
rents instead of passing them to their customers, they su¤er from cuts in termination rates.
The worst scenario from the viewpoint of rms is adopting the bill and keep regime. In
this case, Vodafone yields the lowest prot for  = 0:3 (i.e., when Movistar starts to charge
di¤erent prices for on- and o¤-net calls), whereas Orange reaches its lowest prot for  = 0:5
(i.e., when Vodafone starts to charge di¤erent prices for on- and o¤-net calls). We also note
that for access charges at or above cost, the prot of the two larger operators is increasing
in  (as long as it is not too high). Conversely, for low/moderate values of , Orange and
Yoigos prot decrease with .
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% TCS % TP % TW
 0:1 0:3 0:5 0:7 0:1 0:3 0:5 0:7 0:1 0:3 0:5 0:7
a2012 1:6 1:7 2:1 3:4  5:4  5:0  4:6  4:8 0:5 0:8 1:1 2:2
ac b 4:2 4:6 5:4 7:9  16:9  15:9  14:7  14:3 1:0 1:6 2:5 4:6
ab&k 5:4 8:2 10:1 13:9  23:4  32:8  34:9  35:2 1:0 2:3 3:7 6:8
Table 2: % Change in Total Consumer Surplus, Total Prots and Total Welfare Over a2010
Aggregate surpluses and total welfare. We now proceed to analyse the impact of
termination charges on aggregate surpluses and total welfare. We compute total consumer
surplus (TCS M CS), total prots (TP P4i=1 i) and total welfare (TW ) which equals
the sum of the two previous terms. In Hurkens and López (2010) we already showed that for
 = 0 total welfare is maximized with termination charges at cost (ac b), whereas consumer
surplus is maximized with a below-cost termination charge. According to our simulations,
for  = 0 total consumer surplus is 3:9% higher with ab&k than with a2010, total welfare is
0:72% higher with ac b than with a2010, and total prots is 17:1% lower with ac b than with
a2010, and 17:3% lower with ab&k than with a2010. Table II details the change in aggregate
surpluses of various interconnection arrangements over a2010 for di¤erent positive values of
the call externality parameter  (results are reported in percentage).
Not surprisingly, total consumer surplus and total welfare are decreasing in termination
charge, whereas total prot is increasing in termination charge. What is striking about
Table II however, is the small change on total welfare and the large change on total prot
when the industry adopts the bill and keep regime, as compared to the base scenario a2010.
In particular, for  = 0:1 total consumer surplus and total welfare increase by 5 and 1%
respectively, whereas total prot decreases by 23%.
4.2 Asymmetric termination rates
The focus of this paper has been to examine the implication of alternative scenarios of future
termination rates. The case of asymmetric termination rates is of particular interest. For
this reason, we compare the case where all rmsMTRs are regulated at cost with the
one where only the smallest and most recent entrant Yoigo is allowed to charge a4 = 0:04
(denoted by a); and the one where both Yoigo and Orange are allowed to charge an MTR
equal to 0:04 (denoted by a0). Table III details the outcomes. Clearly Yoigo gains and the
other rms loose from getting the exclusive preferential treatment a. Yoigos prot increases
above 100% because its starting prot is small. Notice that consumers are also better o¤,
whereas total welfare is reduced. This result is in line with Peitz (2005). He considers an
asymmetric market and termination-based price discrimination, and shows that by granting
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1 2 3 4 3 4 CS TW
ac b 0:47 0:31 0:19 0:01
0:1 a 0:47 0:30 0:19 0:02  2:89% 138% 0:05%  0:12%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:26 0:02 70:27% 92%  0:24%  0:48%
ac b 0:47 0:31 0:19 0:01
0:3 a 0:47 0:30 0:19 0:02  3:61% 159% 0:07%  0:13%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:25 0:02 69:75% 101%  0:21%  0:56%
ac b 0:46 0:31 0:20 0:01
0:5 a 0:46 0:31 0:19 0:02  4:55% 168% 0:11%  0:14%
a0 0:44 0:27 0:25 0:02 63:32% 101%  0:17%  0:62%
ac b 0:44 0:32 0:21 0:01
0:8 a 0:44 0:31 0:20 0:03  5:9% 163% 0:21%  0:12%
a0 0:42 0:28 0:25 0:02 53:22% 94:84%  0:16%  0:65%
Table 3: Change in Orange and Yoigos Prot, Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare Over
Cost-Based Access Charges (ac b)
an access markup to the smaller operator, its prot and consumer surplus increase, whereas
total surplus decreases. Our simulations show that this result holds in asymmetric oligopolies
with passive expectations and positive call externality. However, since Yoigo is very small, the
aggregate e¤ects are really minor. When also Orange is allowed to charge 0:04 for terminating
calls, it benets a lot and Movistar and Vodafone are hurt. In particular, Orange increases
its market share at the expense of Movistar and Vodafones customer bases. The e¤ect
on Yoigos prot is also positive because of termination revenues. Nonetheless, consumer
surplus and total welfare decrease for all values of the call externality parameter.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the e¤ects of MTR regulation can be predicted by rst calibrating
the model of Hurkens and López (2010) (extended to account for asymmetries and call
externalities) and then calculating equilibrium outcome under di¤erent MTR regimes. We
did this for the Spanish market and found that lowering termination rates toward cost is
always good for consumer surplus and total welfare but hurts all rms. As we reduce the
level of MTRs, rmsprot signicantly decrease, whereas the impact of reducing termination
charges on consumer surplus and welfare is moderate and mild respectively. Remarkably,
lowering MTR does not always lead to increases in the xed fee. We saw that the largest rm
may actually reduce xed fee when call externality is strong. In addition, market shares of
the two larger rms typically increase as the termination charge decreases. Our simulations
also show that above-cost termination charges may induce the smallest operator to o¤er
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subsidies so as to capture some market share. Asymmetric termination rates of the form
that the smaller rms are allowed to charge an access markup, whereas the larger rms are
subject to cost-based regulation results in higher prots for the smaller rms but also in
lower total welfare.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Equilibrium Fixed Fees [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b (.-), ab&k (..)]
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Figure 2: Equilibrium O¤-Net Prices [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b (.-), ab&k (..)] and On-Net
Price (bold dashed line)
Figure 3: Equilibrium Market Shares [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b (.-), ab&k (..)]
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Prots [a2010 (-), a2012 (- -), ac b (.-), ab&k (..)]
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